NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 9 | Number 2

Article 2

2-1-1931

The Parol Evidence Rule in North Carolina
James H. Chadbourn
Charles T. McCormick

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
James H. Chadbourn & Charles T. McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule in North Carolina, 9 N.C. L. Rev. 151 (1931).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol9/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE IN NORTH
CAROLINA
JAmES H. CEADBOURN* AND CHARLES T. McCoRmicK**
"There is a grouping together of a mass of incongruous matter,
and then it is looked at in a wrong focus." So speaks Thayer of the
case law on parol evidence.' That the familiar formula against varying, adding to, or contradicting the terms of a writing has confounded
the precedents will hardly be gainsaid. Only the master hand of
Wigmore has been able to erect a logical superstructure out of the
bulk of conflicting data. On the other hand, judicial expressions of
dissatisfaction have not been wanting. The admonition of Shepherd, J., in Moffitt v. Maness2 is reiterated in many North Carolina
cases and doubtless supplies an inarticulate premise in others:
"There is, we fear, too great 2 tendency to relax the well settled rules
of evidence against the admissibility of parol testimony, to contradict, vary or add to, the terms of a written contract, and it is thought
that the courts, in their anxiety to avoid probable injustice in particular cases, are gradually construing away a principle which has always been considered one of the greatest barriers against fraud and
perjury.... The principles upon which parol testimony is excluded
in the case of written contracts are plain, but their application to the
infinite variety of transactions daily arising is exceedingly difficult,
and the books are full of conflicting decisions on the subject. We
think we have gone far enough in this State in their liberal application, and the wise rules which are intended for the protection
of the provident should not be refined away for the relief of the
negligent."
The purpose here desired to be accomplished by a strict construction
of the rule-protection of the provident from fraud and perjury-is
a legitimate aim of the law. But the present confusion calls for more
than a policy of construction. It indicates the need of a critical
appraisal of the local precedents. This is the purpose of present discussion. It is made possible by the masterful analyses of Thayer,
Wigmore, and Williston.2
*Student Editor-in-Chief,

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REmIEv,

1930-31.

**Dean
and Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
1

THAYER, A PRELImINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE CommoN LAW,
390.3102
N. C. 457, 9, 64, 9 S. E. 399,
401 (1889).
'TnAYER, op. cit. supra note 1, c. x; 5 WIGMO RE EVIDNCE (1923) c. lxxxvi;
2 WILLIsToN, CONTRACTS (1920) §631 et seq.
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I. THE RuLE IN GENERAL
A discussion of the local aspects of the problem should be prefaced by some general considerations. The theoretical nature of the
rule is no longer open to doubt. Thayer and Wigmore have shown
convincingly that, despite the popular notion, it is not a rule of evidence based on a supposed superior probative force of written over
unwritten evidence. It is rather a rule of substantive law defining
what facts are legally effective when there is a writing.4 The acceptance of this premise calls for a restatement of the rule in other
than the conventional form.
Wigmore's statement is preceded by an elaborate and enlightening
discourse on the constitution of jural acts, that is, those having legal
effectiveness. It is believed that the following definition distils the
essence of his conclusions from the necessarily technical language of
his theory of jural acts: Any or all parts of a transaction prior to or
contemporaneouswith a writing intended to record them finally are
superseded and mde legally ineffective by the writing. It will be
noted that prior or contemporaneous agreements are superseded
whether they are oral or written. 5 The rule obviously does not operate to exclude proof of oral or written agreements subsequent to the
writing.0
Three situations are common under the rule. The writing in
question may be only a casual memorandum of the transaction, not
intended to supersede any oral agreements. Receipts, memoranda of
auction sales, and perfunctory letters in business intercourse are
common examples in the books.1 At the opposite extreme the writing often contains an explicit statement that it supersedes all prior
"THAYER, op. cit. supra note 3; 5 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 3, §2400. In
North Carolina the rule is treated as one of evidence. Witness the decisions
when the rule is invoked for the first time on appeal. Instead of applying the
principle that the appellate court will give either party the benefit of a rule of
substantive law in his favor, whether raised at the trial below or not, the cases
hold that either party has waived the benefit of the rule by not objecting to the
evidence below. Scott v. Green, 89 N. C. 278 (1883). See Sykes v. Everett,
167 N. C. 600, 4, 83 S. E. 585, 8 (1914) ; Miller v. Farmers' Federation, 192
N. C. 144, 7, 134 S.E. 407, 9 (1926).
'Lindsay v. King, 23 N. C. 401 (1841); Newbern v. Newbern, 178 N. C. 3,
100 S. E. 77 (1919) (proof of contents of letter disallowed).
'Harris v. Murphy, 119 N. C. 34, 25 S. E. 708 (1895); Freeman v. Bell,
150 N. C. 146, 63 S. E. 682 (1909).
"Satterfield v. Smith, 33 N. C. 60 (1850) (paper read in connection with
hiring slave at auction); Lutz v. Thompson, 87 N. C. 335 (1882) (writing
alleged to be contract in connection with settlement of estate) ; Adickes v.
Drewry, 171 N. C. 667, 89 S. E. 23 (1916) (letter referring to terms of former
contract). Receipt cases pott note 71.
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and contemporaneous agreements of the parties. 8 Finally the writing
may supersede only a part of the prior and contemporaneous agreements. It is then final as to the part of the transaction it is intended
to embody, but offers no obstacle to the proof of the other part. Since
Wigmore's treatise it has become popular to speak of the process by
which a writing supersedes the prior and contemporaneous agreements in a transaction as an integration. The integration is then
complete, as illustrated in the second situation mentioned above, or
partial, as illustrated in the situation last discussed. The bulk of the
problems presented by the parol evidence rule center on a determination of whether the writing has accomplished the one or the other of
these two kinds of integration.
At the outset the facile statement of the rule raises two concrete
questions of weighty importance: (1) What is the proper procedure
for determining the intent with which a writing was made? (2) Is
the test of such intent subjective or objective?
If the parol evidence rule were a genuine rule of evidence the
procedural query would be foreclosed by the familiar principle that
the trial court is to determine questions of fact on which depends the
admissibility of testimony challenged under the technical rules of
competency or admissibility. But the conclusion that the trial court
should decide the vital question of intention may still be deduced by
a glance at the unexpressed policy that underlies this rule of substantive law.
The rule itself seems a compromise between two ideas. The
overthrow of written contracts by fabricated extrinsic negotiations
should be prevented. At the same time the freedom of parties to
determine their contractual rights and duties should not be unduly
impaired. The result is that the categorical exclusion of negotiations
extrinsic to the writing which one aspect of the policy demands is
supplanted by an exclusionary rule based on the intent with which
the written instrument was made. Now the judge by virtue of training and experience possesses an expertness qualified to effectuate the
twofold purpose of the rule. The reactions of a jury are far more
likely to be predominantly emotional than those of the judge. Clever
fabrications tending to overthrow the writing fare well under the
democratic standards of the traditional triers of fact. A mind of
judicial temper is better suited to apply a rule intended to protect the
written agreement.
' Cases cited post note 30.
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What test of intention shall the court apply? Three patently
spurious tests should be dismissed from the beginning. It has been
said that the test of whether the writing supersedes the oral agreement is whether the latter "contradicts, varies, or adds to" the writing.9 The oral agreement will always add to or vary the writing. If
it does not there is no necessity for proving it. This fallacy is doubtless produced by the thoughtless repetition of the traditional phraseology of the rule. Again it is said that the writing is the sole test
of the intent. 10 Obviously it cannot be determined whether the oral
agreement was intended to be covered by the writing without examining the oral agreement to determine the relation of the two. Finally
it has been said that the test is whether the oral agreement is "collateral" to the writing." This so-called test is so vague that it must
be dismissed as meaningless. The real choice that forces itself to the
forefront is not between any of the foregoing vagaries, but between
subjective or objective intent. The problem is brought out in bold
relief by the contrast of a Pennsylvania and Connecticut case. The
Pennsylvania case of Gianni v. R. Russel & Co. 12 was a suit by the
lessee of a building against his lessor. The written lease provided
that plaintiff could sell fruit, drinks, etc., but not tobacco. Plaintiff
sued for breach of an alleged oral agreement that he was to have the
exclusive right to sell fruit and drinks in the building. The court
held, applying the following test, that the written lease had superseded the oral agreements:
"When does the oral agreement come within the field embraced by
the written one? This can be answered by comparing the two, and
determining whether parties,situated as were the ones to the contract,
would naturally and normlly include the one in the other if it were
made (italics ours). If they relate to the same subject-matter and
are so interrelated that both would be executed at the same time and
in the same contract, the scope of the subsidiary agreement must be
taken to be covered by the writing. This question must be determined by the court."

The Connecticut case of Strakosch v. Connecticut Tiutst Co.l8 was
an action against an executor for breach of an oral agreement by the
testator to settle an income on plaintiff when adopted by him. The
95 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 3, §2431 criticising this so-called test.
" Childs v. South Jersey Amusement Co., 95 N. J. E. 207, 122 Atl. 803
(1923).
De Lassalle v. Guildford, L. R. (1901) 2 K. B. 215.
1281 Pa. 320, 126 Atl. 791 (1924).

79 Conn. 133, 64 Atl. 1 (1906).
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court found that the written instrument of adoption had not superseded this oral agreement, applying the following test as the one approved in other Connecticut cases:
"The plaintiff's claim that the existence of the written agreement
rendered the prior oral agreement between the parties ... of no avail
to the defendant. This claim is based on the so-called 'parol evidence
rule,' that where parties merge all prior negotiations and agreements
in writing, intending to make that the repository of their final understanding, evidence of such prior negotiations and agreements will be
rejected as immaterial ....
Whether the partiesintended the writing
to embody their entire oral agreement or only a part of it (italics
ours), was a question for the trial court to be determined from the
conduct and language of the parties and the surrounding circumstances; and that court has found that the parties had no such intent,
and there is nothing in the record to show that the court in reaching
that conclusion, erred either in law or in logic."
As a matter of abstract theoretical accuracy it is not to be denied
that the proper test for the trial court to apply is the subjective one
-what did these parties intend? It should hear the evidence and
make a specific finding that the parties did or did not actually intend
that their writing should supersede the oral agreement. This means
that the court must pass on the credibility of the witnesses and make
a finding that one or the other speaks untrutlifully. The strain is
great. On the other hand, if the specific finding should be what
reasonable men would have intended under the circumstances, the
embarrassment of imputing mendacity to the witnesses is relieved.
The theoretical artificiality of substituting the hypothetical intent of
the "straw man" for the actual intent of the parties is outweighed by
the greater ease with which a finding can be made on the former.
Furthermore, the probability that in the judge's mind the two will
almost always coincide needs scarcely to be emphasized. It is true
that the application of the objective standard, notably in negligence
cases, normally falls within the province of the jury. At least one
analogy, however, supports the conclusion that it is within the legitimate province of the trial court in cases arising under the parol evidence rule. In actions for malicious prosecution the trial court
determines the question of probable cause. 14 Other examples could
be cited where sound procedural policy has dictated the delegation to
the judge of certain difficult questions of fact where the jury's inexpert handling of them. is likely to result in serious abuse. The
" Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 159 N. C. 265, 74 S. E. 740 (1912).
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difficulties of the application of the parol evidence rule demand the
expert hand for guidance if written transactions are to be relied on.

II. THE NORTH CAROLINA DOCTRINE
The North Carolina court in a long line of cases has abrogated
the parol evidence rule for most purposes. However inadvertently
this result may have been reached, it is manifest and apparent. The
doctrine is summed up by Walker, J., in Evans v. Freewtan:'r
'But this rule applies only when the entire agreement has been reduced to writing, for if merely a part has been written, and the other
part has been left in parol, it is competent to establish the latter part
by oral evidence, provided it does not conflict with what has been
written.... Numerous other cases have been decided by this Court
in which the application of the same principle has been made to various combinations of facts, all tending, though, to the same general
conclusion that such evidence is competent where it does not conflict
with the written part of the agreement and tends to supply its complement or to prove some collateral agreement made at the same time.
. ..This Court refused to apply the principle in (citations omitted)
because the oral evidence tended to contradict or vary the written
part of the contract and not merely to add other consistent terms .... "
The records disclose that neither the court nor the jury makes any
finding as to the intent with which the writing is made, but oral agreements are admitted wherever they do not directly contradict the writing. The jury, it is true, is often charged in substance as follows:
Parol evidence is admissible when the contract is partly written and
partly oral, but the oral part cannot contradict the written.' 0 But if
this is a direction to them to find the intent with which the writing
was made (which may be doubted in view of the ritualistic way in
which the sentence is used), it is made ineffectual by the form in
which the issues are cast. The issues are generally: (1) Was the
oral agreement made? (2) Was it breached? (3) Damages? This
offers the jury no chance to express a finding of the intent of the
parties, even if they have construed the charge as such a direction.
Greene v. Bechtel 17 is typical. The action was to recover architect
fees. The written contract provided for part payment in the stock of
the Land O' Sky Development Co. Plaintiff demanded the entire
amount in cash, alleging breach of a parol agreement by defendant
142 N. C. 61, 54 S. E. 847 (1906).
in Greene v. Bechtel, 193 N. C. 94, 136 S. E. 294 (1926).

the charge
1 E.g.
Supra note 16.
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to convey land to the Development Company which would have given
its stock value. The jury was charged as follows:
"When a contract is written, the law will not allow it to be altered,
varied from, or cQnttadicted by parol evidence. When they put their
contract in writing, that is the contract, but when a part of the contract is written and a part of it is in parol or verbal, and the verbal
.part does not alter, vary or contradict the written part, then the party
claiming that parol agreement may show it by parol evidence. That
If the alleged parol contract in this, case was made as claimed that it
does not contradict or alter the written agreement and may be shown
by verbal evidence...'
The issues were:
"1, Was plaintiff induced to enter into the contract with the defendant and to perform said -contract as architect upon the parol
agreement by the defendant, made at the time of the written contract, that he would convey the Stradley Mountain lands to the...
Development Co.?
2. If so, did defendant fail to convey said land... ?
3. What damages, if any, is plaintiff entitled to recover?"
A judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed. Under this procedure,
which is illustrated in many other cases, it is obvious that the only
check on the admissibility of extrinsic agreements is whether they
contradict the writing. If the trial court decides this question favorably to the proponent of the extrinsic agreement, the jury are
asked merely whether such an agreement was made. The procedure
followed by the cases carries the quoted language of Walker, J., to
its full extent.
It is often said that the admission of extrinsic agreements under
the above procedure does not "vary, contradict, or add to" the written contract, but merely shows the entire contract that was made.' 8
This begs the question. Whether the writing is all of the contract
or only part of it is the inquiry.' 9 This depends on the vital question
of intent. The consistency of the written and oral agreements is
important only for the light it sheds on the question of what reason" Clark, C. J., in Garland v. Improvement Co., 184 N. C. 551, 115 S. E. 164
(1922) : "This is not varying, altering, or contradicting the written instrument,
but merely showing further the entire contract that was made."
"The same fallacy is involved in the following reasoning from Farquhar
Co. v. Hardy Hardware Co., 174 N. C. 369, 93 S. E. 922 (1917): "If we should
decide otherwise in this case and hold the evidence (of an oral agreement) to be
competent it would be making a contract for the parties which they did not
make for themselves."
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able men would intend under t'e circumstances. To admit oral agreements merely because they are not contradictory to the writing and
without determining the actual or apparent intent of the parties as
to whether oral and written words should both stand, is to make of
the traditional prohibition against adding to the terms of the contract
an empty mockery. It overlooks the vital truth that ordinarily when
parties omit alleged oral agreements from writings complete in form,
they do so because they have either never made such oral agreements
or have discarded them in the course of negotiations.

The qualification that even though the contract is only partly
written, the parol agreement cannot be admitted when it would contradict the writing, is often expressed as a qualification that the agreement must not "vary" the writing. Obviously any parol agreement
of any practical significance will vary the writing. The word
"vary" is apparently used in a technical sense. The fact is that much
of the traditional phraseology has become a litany. The court repeats the trilogy of prohibitions-varying, contradicting, adding toeither' without a thought of their common usage or intending to give
them a technical signification. A random example is the language in
Hite v. Aydlett. 20 Plaintiff sued to recover architect fees. The contract was in writing. Defendant alleged breach of an oral stipulation
that the completed plans would call for a building not to cost over
$17,000, when in fact the lowest bid on the plans had been $22,000.
The court allowed the oral agreement and said:
"The terms of the contract, which defendant contended were not ineluded in the (written) proposal and acceptance and which the parol
evidence tended to establish, do not contradict, vary, or add to the
terms of the contract as contained in the writing."
A short summary at this point may prove helpful. 1. Two possible tests for the application of the parol evidence rule are suggested: If a prior or contemporaneous agreement was made (a) did
these parties intend the writing to supersede it or (b) would parties
ordinarily so intend? The latter test seems preferable.
2. If the desired protection of written transactions is to be
secured, the judge instead of the jury should decide the question.
3. Seemingly North Carolina has unconsciously, while professing
to adhere to the parol evidence rule, actually abandoned it except in
- 192 N. C. 166, 134 S. E. 419 (1926).
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cases of contradiction, that is "total inconsistency" between the alleged oral transaction and the writing.
The local cases applying the doctrine of Evans v. Freeman are
legion. Much conflict of result is to be expected. Such is the inevitable effect of the looseness of the test applied-merely whether
the oral agreement contradicts the writing. Judges have suggested
different epithets in the hope, necessarily a forlorn one, of avoiding
more confusion. Hoke, J., suggests that the test is whether the oral
agreement "radically changes the writing." 21 Brogden, J., has recently suggested the phrase "total inconsistency." 22 A frank adoption of the objective standard of intention, the enlightened test of
the Gianni case, is the only sound move towards a reinstatement of
the rule in this jurisdiction. Indeed it may be that this natural way
of solving the problems arising under the rule is implicit even in
opinions which speak the language of Evans v. Freeman. This can be
determined only from an examination of the cases.
Deeds
A liberality in allowing parol agreements is noticeable where the
writing is a deed. Here the idea that reasonable men would not intend the deed to supersede all of the previous oral agreements of
the transaction may be exerting an unexpressed influence. The deed
is required by law to be written. In the normal case is it not probable that the deed would be executed only to comply with the law
and not to supersede all oral agreements? This feature, unique in
the type of cases under consideration, was perceived by Pearson,
C. J., in Flynt v. Conrad:28
"It would be strange if the execution of one part of the agreement
in the only way in which it could be executed, should exclude proof
and defeat the other part... ."
The usual allowable oral agreement is a reservation of crops, or an
agreement to make repairs.2 4 The liberality ceases when the oral
Lytton Mfg. Co. v. House Lumber Co., 161 N. C.430, 77 S. E. 233 (1913).
=Miller v. Farmer's Federation, supra note 4, at 147.
61 N. C. 191 (1867) (parol reservation of growing corn from deed of
land allowed to be shown).
'Allowed: Manning v. Jones, 44 N. C. 369 (1853) (agreement to make repairs) ; Johnson v. R. R, 116 N. C. 926, 21 S. E. 28 (1895) (agreement to pay
grantor additional sum for all land in excess of 20 ft., no amount being specified in deed); Buie v. Kennedy, 164 N. C. 290, 80 S. E. 445 (1913) (agreement
of grantor to pay for shortage in turpentine ioxes) ; Pate v. Gaitley, 183 N. C.
262, 111 S. E. 339 (1922) (parol reservation of rent cotton due under previous
lease) ; Anderson v. Nichols, 187 N. C. 808, 123 S. E. 86 (1924) (agreement
't
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agreement would change the essential nature of a deed absolute. Thus
a deed absolute cannot be converted into a mortgage by an oral agreement,2 5 though an absolute assignment of a mercantile contract can
be shown to have been made as a security. 28 Also a parol trust or
agreements equivalent to a trust in favor of the grantor may not be
shown,2 7 though a parol trust in favor of one other than the grantor
may be shown.2 8 Normally, the intent to supersede oral agreements
as to the user of the estate would be the same in all these cases. The
Gianni test would have tended to minimize these irreconcilable conflicts. Leases for terms of more than three years involve the same
29
features. The point is not emphasized in the cases.
of mortgagor to reconvey furniture in hotel covered by mortgage) ; Exum v.
Lynch, 188 N. C. 392, 125 S. E. 15 (1924) (agreement of grantor to release
grantee on note upon resale by latter and to substitute liability of grantee's
vendee).
Disallowed: Boone v. Hardie, 87 N. C. 73 (1882) (agreement that trustee
should take possession immediately, deed providing that should take possession
in 12 months) ; Walker v. Venters, 148 N. C. 388, 62 S. E. 510 (1908) (agreement that consideration be paid in money at vendee's option, deed providing
for payment in cotton); Wilson v. Scarboro, 163 N. C. 380, 79 S. E. 811
(1913) (timber deed providing that timber be cut in 5 years; oral agreement
to cut continuously and make bond).
' Newbern v. Newbern, 178 X. C. 3, 100 S. E. 77 (1919).
" Carson v. Insurance Co., 161 N. C. 441, 77 S. E. 353 (1913).
'Dickenson v. Dickenson, 6 N. C. 279 (1813) (absolute deed of slave not
allowed to be shown to have been given subject to parol agreement to reconvey) ; Bonham v. Craig, 80 N. C. 224 (1879) (same for deed of land) ; Egerton
v. Jones, 102 N. C. 278, 9 S. E. 2 (1889) (parol agreement to treat absolute
deed as deed of trust in favor of grantor disallowed) ; Gaylord v. Gaylord,
150 N. C. 222, 63 S. E. 1028 (1909) (same-the leading case); Walters v.
Walters, 172 N. C. 328, 90 S. E. 304 (1916) (parol agreement of grantee to
sell land and give grantor part of proceeds disallowed). In Thomas v. Carteret County, 182 N. C. 374, 109 S. E. 384 (1921), defendant, in consideration
of the Governor's promise of a pardon, gave a deed of trust to secure plaintiff
county for return of funds which defendant's nephew had misappropriated.
The court relied on this line of cases to exclude proof of county's oral promise
to seek first other sources of indemnity. A better line of cases would have
been that cited in note 24. Perhaps the liberality of those cases in favor of
parol agreements and the strong equity of the county in the case in hand explain the court's assiduous avoidance of the authorities nearest in point. See
generally Lord and Van Hecke, Parol Trusts in North Carolina (1930) 8 N. C.
L. Ray. 152.
'Jones v. Jones, 164 N. C. 320, 80 S. E. 430 (1913).
'Allowed: Cumming v. Barber, 99 N. C. 332, 5 S. E. 903 (1888) (lease
provided for election by lessee to rebuild in case of fire and that he should
have insurance in such case; parol agreement that he was to have insurance
immediately and for purpose of rebuilding) ; Bunn v. Wall, 180 N. C. 662, 104
S. E. 470 (1920) (lessor's agreement to build a barn).
Disallowed: Ray v. Blackwell, 94 N. C. 10 (1886) ; (lessee's agreement that
lessor could move building); Taylor v. Hunt, 118 N. C. 168, 24 S. E. 359
(1896) (agreement that debt secured by lease should be indulged).
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Contracts of Sale
The large manufacturer or distributor selling to the small consumer usually has as one of the terms of the written contract of sale
a stipulation that it contains the entire agreement of the parties, and
that no representations or warranties of the agent shall be binding on
the company unless included in the writing. The written provision
seem always to control.8 0 A realistic view of the situation of the
parties might conduce to the opposite conclusion. The economic
pressure and superior bargaining power of the large manufacturer
enable him to exact the written provision for complete supersession
from his economically weaker customer. The court might take the
view that this was patently a tribute of the weak to the strong; that
both parties knew that the written provision did not express the buyer's real intention; and that consequently it was of no effect. Suffice
it to say that this view has not been taken, though a perusal of these
cases leads to the conclusion that often it would have worked more
substantial justice than the legalistic view of the transaction.
The singular consistency of result in the above situation is naturally enough not found in others. The cases concerning contracts
of sale where there is no written stipulation for the complete supremacy of the writing are conflicting in their results.8 ' The loose"Medicine Co. v. Mizell, 148 N. C. 384, 62 S. E. 511 (1908); Simpson v.
Green, 160 N. C. 301, 76 S. E. 237 (1912) ; Bland v. Harvester Co., 169 N. C.
418, 86 S. E. 350 (1915); Farquhar Co. v. Hardy Hardware Co., 174 N. C.
369, 93 S. E. 922 (1917); Murray Co. v. Broadway, 176 N. C. 149, 96 S. E.
990 (1921) ; Colt Co. v. Turlington, 184 N. C. 137, 113 S. E. 600 (1922).
" SALE OF LAND.
Allowed: Stern v. Benbow, 151 N. C. 460, 66 S. E. 445
(1909) (guarantee of acreage) ; Anderson v. Suburban Corporation, 155 N. C.
131, 71 S. E. 221 (1911) (promise to make improvements) ; Brown v. Hobbs,
147 N. C. 73, 60 S. E. 716 (1908) (agreement that vendee would resell and
pay vendor part of profit) ; Henderson v. Forrest, 184 N. C. 230, 114 S. E.
391 (1922) (agreement that vendee would see that another purchased if he did
not, contract having given him option).
Disallowed: Nickelson v. Reves, 94 N. C. 559 (1886) (promise to pay
additional sum if acreage exceeded that described) ; Summit Avenue Building
Co. v. Sanders, 183 N. C. 413, 111 S. E. 705 (1922) (parol stipulation as to
organization of enterprise by defendants).
SALE OF PEasoNALTy.
Allowed: Wilson v. Holley, 66 N. C. 408 (1872)
(fishing apparatus; oral agreement as to place of delivery) ; Typewriter Co. v.
Hardware Co., 143 N. C. 97, 55 S. E. 417 (1906) (typewriter; oral agreement
that purchaser should have agent's commissions on four other sales) ; Willis
v. Construction Co., 152 N. C. 100, 67 S. E. 265 (1910) (R. R. materials; oral
agreement as to transportation and place of delivery); Lytton Mfg. Co. v.
House Lumber Co., 161 N. C. 430, 77 S. E. 233 (1913) (appliance; oral agreement as to exchange); Brown v. Mitchell, 168 N. C. 312, 84 S. E. 404 (1915)
(sick mule; oral title retention agreement-dictum) ; Crown Co. v. Jones, 196
N. C. 208, 145 S. E. 5 (1928) (bottle crowns; oral agreement as to size of
shipments).
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ness of the test applied-merely whether the oral matter contradicts
the written-should be expected to produce such a result. One extreme case drawn from the class under discussion deserves special
comment. In Colgate Co. v. Lattas 2 defendant ordered in writing
100 boxes of octagon soap at a stipulated price. He was allowed to
show a parol agreement that he was to pay for only 50 boxes. The
court makes the remarkable assertion that "The extrinsic evidence
.. .did not tend to contradict the writing." The statement and the
result seem palpably erroneous.
The cases on proof of warranties resting in parol (where there is
no written stipulation of complete supremacy) are few. They are
all decided adversely to the proponent of the extrinsic warranty.88
In two of them the writing contained a warranty of title and it was
sought to prove a parol warranty of soundness. The obvious circumstance of significance is the fact that the writing does deal with the
subject of warranties, a strong indication that reasonable men would
intend it to deal with the subject finally.
Contracts for Services
Contracts for rendering services of all kinds which present the
problem of partial integration abound in the books. The written
stipulation of complete supremacy is conspicuously absent, and the
conflict of result is dumbfounding. For example, in Meekins v.
Newberry3 4 a parol agreement as to furnishing rafting gear was
allowed in aid of a written contract for rafting logs. The opposite
result was reached in Garland v. Improvement Co.85 where a parol
agreement as to furnishing hauling facilities was not allowed in aid
Disallowed: Clark v. McMillan, 4 N. C. 244 (1815) (sale of note, payment
forthcoming on recovery from maker; oral agreement to start suit against
maker in 10 days); Donaldson v. Benton, 20 N. C. 572 (1832) (logs; oral
agreement for no payment until resale by vendee) ; Fertilizer Works v. McLawhorn, 158 N. C. 274, 73 S. E. 833 (1912) (fertilizer; oral agreement as to
analysis); American Potato Co. v. Jenette Bros., 172 N. C. 1, 89 S. E. 791
(1916) (potatoes "to be best quality shipped from county"; oral agreement
that were to be good, medium size, and bright). See same case 174 N. C.
236, 93 S. E. 795 (1918) where purchaser won on theory of fraud and mistake;
Acme Mfg. Co. v. McPhail, 181 N. C. 205, 106 S. E. 672 (1921) (written stipulation that seller to be at no expense after arrival of goods at X; oral agreement that he should pay logging road freight to Y).
115 N. C. 127, 20 S.E. 388 (1894).
'Smith v. Williams, 5 N. C. 426 (1810) (written warranty of title; parol
warranty of soundness); Pender v. Fobes, 18 N. C. 250 (1835) (same);
Etheridge v. Palin, 72 N. C. 213 (1875) (written contract for sale of fishing
apparatus; oral warranty of quantity and quality).
'101 N. C.17,7 S.E.655 (1888).
184 N. C.551, 117 S.E.787 (1922).
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of a written contract for cutting timber. The other cases are cited in
38
the note, which discloses similar inconsistencies.
Miscellaneous Contracts
The doctrine of Evans v. Freeman has been applied to other types
of transactions-stock subscriptions, partnership contracts, agency
contracts, deeds of gift of personalty, bond bids, road subscriptions,
and insurance policies. It is impossible to generalize further. The
cases are cited below and the conflicts noted.3'
Judicial and Legislative Records
Judicial records rest on special grounds. Here a written record
of the entire transaction is required by law. The consequence is the
oft-quoted phrase that the records of a court "import verity."3 8 The
"Allowed: Terry v. R.R., 91 N. C. 236 (1884) (R.R. construction in one

sector; oral agreement for same in another) ; Doubleday v. Asheville Ice Co.,
122 N. C. 675, 30 S. E. 21 (1898) (storing grapes; oral agreement as to keeping storeroom in shape) ; Ivey v. Cotton Mills, 143 N. C. 189, 55 S. E. 613
(1906) (services as mill superintendent; oral agreement as to competency);
Sumner v. Lumber Co., 175 N. C. 654, 96 S. E. 97 (1918) (cutting timber in
one tract; oral agreement to cut on another tract at same price); Hite v.
Aydlett, 192 N. C. 166, 134 S. E. 419 (1926) (facts in text) ; Greene v. Bechtel,
193 N. C. 94, 136 S. E. 294 (1926) (facts in text).
Disallowed: Walker v. Cooper, 150 N. C. 128, 63 S. E. 681 (1909) (to cut
40,000 ft. of lumber per week; oral agreement that amount might be less) ;
Patton v. Sinclaire Lumber Co., 179 N. C. 103, 101 S. E. 613 (1919) (dressing
lumber; oral agreement as to location of piling ground, it being generally stipulated in writing that defendant should furnish piling ground).
"STocn SuBscim sO . Disallowed: N. C. Ry. Co. v. Leach, 49 N. C.
340 (1857) (parol condition of subscription that road would be located at X) ;
Vaughan-Robertson Drug Co. v. Drug Co., 173 N. C. 502, 92 S. E. 376 (1917)
(parol stipulation that part of subscription made for another).
PARTNERSHip CONTRACTS. Allowed: Faust v. Rohr, 167 N. C. 360, 83 S. E.
622 (1914) (written contract to associate; parol agreement to rescind preexisting contract not to compete) ; Spencer v. Bynum, 169 N. C. 119, 85 S.E.
216 (1915) (written contract for dissolution; parol agreement as to sharing
losses).
AGENCY CoNRACTS. Disallowed: Watson v. Spurrier, 190 N. C. 726, 130
S. E. 724, (1925) (written agency to sell land;.parol stipulation that similar
agencies be gotten for adjoining lands).
DEED OF Gin OF PERsoNArLT. Disallowed: Parker v. Vick, 22 N. C. 195
(1838) (donor gave written undertaking to share slaves with plaintiff; parol
agreement that plaintiff not to share till 21).
Bins. Disallowed: Slayton v. Comr's., 186 N. C. 690, 120 S.E. 452 (1923)
(written bid for county bonds providing bidders' attorney should pass them;
parol agreement that attorney who bid was to pass on them).
ROAD SUBscRrno0xs. Disallowed: Rousseau v. Call, 169 N. C. 173, 85 S. E.
414 (1915) (written subscription for construction of road; parol agreement
that not collectible till work completed).
INSURANCE PoLIcrEs. Disallowed: Wilson v. Insurance Co., 155 N. C. 173,
71 S.E.79 (1911) (parol agreement as to surrender value).
"Cline v. Lemon, 4 N. C. 323 (1916) (confirmation of report of special
commission) ; Ridley v. McGehee, 13 N. C. 40 (1829) (Clerk's entry of probate
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same is true of the records of the General Assembly.8 0 Of course,
the court can amend its own records. 40 The analogy is to a subsequent modification or rescission of a written contract. And it may
be shown that the order or record was made in vacation, or forged, or
made by a justice out of his county. 41 Such evidence questions the
validity of the writing and may 'be analogized to evidence of fraud
and mistake or of a condition precedent to the validity of a contract.
Trade Usage
One part of the transaction usually not intended to be covered by
the writing may be a known trade usage or custom. A characteristic
feature of custom is its implicitness, and there is a strong natural
inference that this part of the agreement is normally left out of the
42
writing. It has been so held.

Bills and Notes
Oral agreements when the writing is a negotiable instrument are
of two kinds. They may contradict or supplement the express terms
of the instrument-the amount, the unconditional nature of the
promise, the medium of payment, and the like. On the other hand,
they may contradict or supplement the so-called implied tersobligations growing out of indorsement, presentment, notice and the
like.
In this jurisdiction the express written terms may be varied by
showing a different oral agreement in three respects: 1. To show,
irrespective of any question of conditional delivery, that a promise to
pay money is subject to a variety of conditions and contingencies
where no conditions appear in the writing. 43 2. To show an apparent
and order of registration) ; Wade v. Odeneal, 14 N. C. 423 (1832) (records);
Wynne v. Small, 102 N. C. 133, 8 S. E. 912 (1889) (certificate of probate).

Wilson v. Markley, 133 N. C. 616, 45 S. E. 1023 (1903) ; State v. Armour,

135 N. C. 62, 47 S. E. 411 (1904).
"Galloway v. McKeithen, 27 N. C. 12 (1844).

"Austin v. Rodman, 8 N. C. 71 (1820); Long v. Weaver, 52 N. C. 626

(1860).
'Hunter v. Bynum, 3 N. C. 354 (1805) (written agreement to race horses;
oral proof of custom of forfeiture of half stakes on failure to appear) ; Crown

Co. v. Jones, 196 N. C. 208, 145 S. E. 5 (1928) (written order for bottle
crowns; oral proof of custom of bottlers to pay for their obsolete crowns
left on manufacturer's hands).
'Allowed: Walters v. Walters, 34 N. C. 28 (1851) (that bond for $50
should be surrendered on payment of costs in pending litigation) ; Woodfin v.
Sleeder, 61 N. C. 200 (1867) (that only so much as would pay debt of certain
estate would be collected); Clark v. Clark, 65 N. C. 655 (1871) (that only
2/3 should be collected); Kercbner v. McRae, 80 N. C. 219 (1879) (that
credit be given for bale of cotton) ; Braswell v. Pope, 82 N. C. 57 (1880) (to
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co-maker to be a surety or an apparent surety a co-maker. 44 3. To
show a mode of payment different from that expressed in the instrument. 45 Strangely enough the express terms as to time of payment
surrender notes on assignment of judgment secured by mortgage) ; Penniman
v. Alexander, 111 N. C. 427, 16 S. E. 408 (1892) (acceptance; that drawer
continue to do construction work on house); Bresee v. Crumpton, 121 N. C.
122, 28 S. E. 351 (1897) (insurance premium note; that should be surrendered
if smaller policy presented); Kernodle v. Williams, 153 N. C. 475, 69 S. E.
431 (1910) (that should be paid only if needed for debts of father's estate) ;
Martin v. Mask, 158 N. C. 436, 74 S. E. 343 (1912) (to be void if maker
ejected from leased land); Kernodle v. Kernodle, 174 N. C. 441, 93 S. E. 956
(1917) (that was to be considered only as evidence of advancement) ; Farrington v. McNeill, 174 N. C. 420, 93 S. E. 957 (1917) (payment conditional on
recovery of land in pending law suit); Insurance Co. v. Gavin, 187 N. C. 14,
120 S. E. 820 (1924) (that payment of note in series secured by mortgage
under foreclosure be postponed to prior payment of other notes in series);
Smith v. Page Trust Co., 195 N. C. 183, 141 S. E. 575 (1928) (that notes were
made only so payee could discount for what he could get; proved to repel charge
of usury). But it may not be shown that it was agreed that obligor was not
to be liable under any conditions. Bank v. Moore, 138 N. C. 529, 51 S. E. 79
(1905) (note given for bank stock; agreement that maker should not be liable).
Disallowed: Gatlin v. Kilpatrick, 4 N. C. 148 (1814) (if horse died note to
be void--dictum) ; Geddy v. Stainback, 21 N. C. 476 (not to collect till after
death); Ijames v. McClamroch, 92 N. C. 362 (1885) (declarations of obligee
that would collect only portion excluded); Moffitt v. Maness, 102 N. C. 457,
9 S. E. 399 (1889) (that should cover only what appeared to be due on future
settlement); Bank v. McElwee, 104 N. C. 305, 10 S. E. 295 (1889) (recited
to be given for purchase money for land; that should cover also assignment of
judgment) ; Harvester Co. v. Parham, 172 N. C. 389, 90 S. E. 503 (1916) (that
note given for manure spreader should not be payable unless knife-grinder were
furnished without extra cost; Allen, J., dissentiente); Roebuck v. Carson, 196
N. C. 672, 146 S. E. 708 (1929) (that on payment of bonus of $500 payee
would carry maker for life).
That the instrument is non-negotiable makes no difference under the present
situation:
Allowed: Daughtry v. Boothe, 49 N. C. 87 (1856) (bond for hire of slave
with option to retake slave and provision for proportionate payment in such
event; parol stipulation that slave not to be removed from county) ; Perry v.
Hill, 68 N. C. 418 (1873) (receipt containing promise to repay; parol stipulation for Iorebearance to prosecute suit for conversion).
Disallowed: Parker v. Morrill, 98 N. C. 232, 3 S. E. 511 (1887) (additional
stipulation that obligee make certain provisions in his will).
"Allowed: Welfare v. Thompson, 83 N. C. 276 (1880) (co-maker shown
to be surety); Cole v. Fox, 83 N. C. 463 (1880) (same); Williams v. Lewis,
158 N. C. 571, 74 S. E. 17 (1912) (same); Kennedy v. Trust Co., 180 N. C.
225, 104 S. E. 464 (1920) (same); Trust Co. v. Boykin, 192 N. C. 262, 134
S. E. 643 (1926) (same); Howell v. Roberson, 197 N. C. 572, 150 S. E. 32
(1929) (same) ; Gillam v. Walker, 189 N. C. 189, 126 S. E. 424 (1925) (same).
Williams v. Glenn, 92 N. C. 253 (1895) (apparent surety shown to be comaker). An accommodation agreement may, of course, be shown. N. I. L.
§29; Smith v. Haynes, 82 N. C. 448 (1880). Persons apparently jointly and
severally liable may not be shown only pro rata liable. Woods v. Finley, 153
N. C. 497, 69 S. E. 502 (1910).
'Allowed: Walters v. Walters, 33 N. C. 45 (1850) (bond for payment of
sum certain; parol agreement that was to be surrendered on payment of costs
in law suit) ; Sowers v. Earnhart, 64 N. C. 96 (1870) (agreement to pay in
good money after Civil War-under special remedial statutes); Bryan v. Har-
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may not be contradicted. 46 It would seem in the normal case that
as to the unconditional nature of the promise, the time, and mode of
payment, the written express terms would normally be intended to
supersede oral agreements. However, the reasonable intent might
well be that the writing should not supersede an oral agreement that
an apparent co-maker should be a surety. The arrangement between
the ostensible co-maker and the payee may have been necessary to
enable the latter to discount the paper. On the contrary, would not
the writing normally be intended to supersede an oral agreement that
an apparent surety should be a co-maker? The convenience of the
parties would not be promoted in this case by not disclosing their
real relationship in the writing.
Williston's incisive argument has successfully exploded the notion
that rules of law are always to be considered a part of the contract
of the parties based on their presumed intention to include them:
"To assume first that everybody knows the law, and second, that
everyone thereupon makes his contract with reference to it and adopts
its provisions as terms of the agreement, is indeed to pile a fiction
upon a fiction, and certainly without any necessity, for where different conclusions are reached by means of the fiction than would
be reached without it, they are not preferable to the opposite ones.
.. .Doubtless, law frequently is adopted by the parties as a portion
of their agreement. Whether it is or not in any particular case,
should be determined by the same standard '47
of interpretation as is
applied to their expressions in other respects."
The classic case usually used to illustrate the principle of an "implication of law" is that of a contract silent as to the time of performance.
It is commonly said that the law implies performance in a reasonable
rison, 76 N. C. 360 (1877)

(that note for "dollars" should be paid in gold) ;

Quin v. Sexton, 125 N. C. 447, 34 S. E. 542 (1899)

(to be paid only out of

proceeds of another note); Evans v. Freeman, 142 N. C. 61, 54 S. E. 847
(1906) (payment only out of proceeds from resale of article for privilege of
selling which note was given) ; Bank v. Winslow, 193 N. C. 470, 137 S. E. 320
(1927) (that payment should be from sale of goods of maker in payee's hands).
Disallowed: Davis v. Glenn, 76 N. C. 427 (1877) (bond in 1874 payable in
current funds; that was not to be paid in Confederate currency) ; Woodson v.
Beck, 151 N. C. 144, 65 S.E. 751 (1909) (due bill for insurance policy; that
payable
by surrender of old policy-Hoke and Clark dissenting).
'0 Hilliard v. Newberry, 153 N. C. 104, 68 S. E. 1056 (1910); Cauley v.
Dunn, 167 N. C. 32, 83 S.E. 16 (1914) ; Copeland v. Howard, 172 N. C. 823, 90
S. E. 909 (1916) ; Cherokee County v. Meroney, 173 N. C. 653, 92 S.E. 616
(1917); Acme Manufacturing Co. v. McCormick, 175 N. C. 277, 95 S. E. 555
(1918).
In Fertilizer Co. v. Evans, 194 N. C. 244, 139 S. E. 376 (1927), the agreement was after maturity and was properly allowed on the theory that the rule
does not prevent a showing of agreements made subsequent to the writing.
,TWiLLISTON, op. cit. supra note 3, §615.
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time, and parol agreements showing any other time of performance
are ordinarily not allowed. It seems probable, however, that in the
normal case it would not be intended that the rule of reasonable time
should supersede oral agreements relative to time of performance.
This is so for the simple reason that in most cases the transacting
parties will not know of such a rule. A distinction is to be taken
between this case and the case of a blank indorsement. It is likely
that parties indorsing negotiable paper will know of the rule of secondary liability and will intend it to be incorporated in the instrument
and to supersede their oral agreements.
The North Carolina cases reach the opposite conclusion. Perhaps the Gianni test of probable intention has not been applied even
inarticulately in these cases. The rule of performance in a reasonable
time is accepted as the contract of the parties, 48 but the rule of secondary liability is subordinated to contrary oral agreements. Parol
agreements limiting the implied obligations growing out of indorsement are allowed. 49 It was once held that the indorser's implied
secondary liability could be enlarged by an oral agreement to a primary liability. This is now prevented by N. I. L. §§ 63-4 and the
cases so hold. 50 Of course, none of these oral agreements will be
effective against a holder in due course,50 * and it seems that they are
equally ineffective against a holder for value without notice, even
though he takes after maturity. 51
III. NON-APPLICATIONS OF THE RULE
Parol Evidence of Facts Rendering the Writing Invalid
The operation of the parol evidence rule depends on the existence
of a valid writing assented to by the parties as their contract. It
"Miles v. Walker, 179 N. C. 479, 102 S. E. 884 (1920).

4'Davis v. Morgan, 64 N. C. 570 (1869) (that should operate as receipt);
Mendenhall v. Davis, 72 N. C. 150 (1875) (that was transfer of title plus guarantee against confiscation by U. S.) ; Comr's. v. Wasson, 82 N. C. 309 (1880)
(that should operate only as transfer of title) ; Coffin v. Smith, 128 N. C. 252, 38
S. E. 864 (1901) (that was transfer only for purpose of securing debt). In
Hoffman v. Moore, 82 N. C. 313 (1880), the person signing on back before
delivery to payee was allowed to be shown a surety. The burden of proof is
upon the one seeking to avoid the legal effect of the indorsement. Ibid.
1 N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §§3044, 3045; Meyers Co. v. Battle,
170 N. C. 168, 86 S.E. 1034 (1915) ; Busbee v. Creech, 192 N. C. 499, 135 S.E.
326 (1926) ; Wrenn v. Cotton Mills, 198 N. C. 89, 150 S.E. 676 (1929) ; Note
(1930) 8 N. C. L. Rav. 315. Contra: Wright v. Latham, 7 N. C. 298 (parol
agreement to dispense with notice of dishonor-Taylor, C. J., dissentiente).
0'a N. I. L. §57; N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §3038; cases collected
in 5 UNFoRm LAWS ANN. (N. I. L.) 392 (p).
"1Hill v. Shields, 81 N. C. 251 (1879).
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offers, therefore, no obstacle to any evidence which brings the validity
of the writing into question. Oral conditions precedent to the taking
effect of the writing are admitted.52 On the other hand, oral conditions subsequent are not allowed. The one shows the non-execution
of the writing; the other assumes its execution, but seeks to avoid its
legal effect. Dicta in the local cases state that conditions subsequent
may not be shown. 53 When the point is squarely raised, however,
the decisions disallow the condition by the use of the language of
Evans v. Freeman-that,although the contract may be only partly
written, the oral part cannot contradict the written.5 4 Whether the
condition is precedent or subsequent will depend upon subtle connotations of the words used in pleading it. The pleader would do
well ordinarily to use the words of a condition precedent and let the
evidence show whether his pleading misconceives the nature of the
condition. The following from the losing side illustrates the pitfall:
"That the defendants agreed that they would sign an agency contract
which they did upon the express condition and consideration that the
same should be taken in connection with an agency contract of
others." 55
There is one situation that has given some difficulty. What if the
writing states in effect that there are no conditions precedent to its
validity? In White v. Fisheries Co.56 Stacy, J., held that this prevented proof of a conditional delivery. But Connor, J., in Pratt v.
Except in cases of conditional delivery of deed or bond to the grantee or
obligee. See post note 58. The following illustrate the general principle:
Mercantile Co. v. Parker, 163 N. C. 275, 79 S.E. 606 (1913) (order for goods
containing "We agree that no statement made by ourselves or the salesman
will be a part of this agreement unless written in the original order received
and accepted by you." Defendant allowed to show agreement with salesman
that order not to be sent until further instructions and violation thereof.);
Pratt v. Chaffin, 136 N. C. 350, 48 S.E. 768 (1905) ("that it (order) should
be submitted to his partner Hill and if not satisfactory to him that it should
not bind the defendants and in such event they should write plaintiff at once
and order them not to ship the goods.") ; Building Co. v. Sanders, 185 N. C.
328, 117 S.E. 3 (1923) (defendant's evidence that contract of lease delivered
"only on condition that it would not become operative . . . unless within 10
days they could interest certain men of means in the undertaking"; Overall
Co. v. Hollister Co., 186 N. C. 208, 119 S.E. 1 (1923) ("that same (order)
should not become effective or operative if goods ordered from another dealer
were received").
" See Thomas v. Carteret, 182 N. C. 374, 9, 109 S.E. 384, 6 (1921) ; Overall
Co. v. Hollister, supra note 52, at 209.
"A good illustration is Watson v. Spurrier, 190 N. C. 726, 130 S.E. 624

(1925).

'Watson v. Spurrier, supra note 54, at 731.
'183 N. C. 228, 111 S.E. 182 (1922).
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Chafn57 had previously held the contrary on the seemingly correct
ground that this provision, like all others in the contract, had never
become effective because of the condition:
"The contention made by the plaintiffs that, because of the statement
in the order, there was no understanding with the salesman, except
as printed or written on the order, the defendants are prevented from
showing the agreement (that the order was not effective until approved by partner) assumes the very question in controversy whether
there was any valid, binding contract."
There are early cases in this jurisdiction to the effect that there
can be no delivery of a deed in escrow to the grantee or of a bond
to the obligee.6 8 But in the case of bonds and in some deed cases the
court has allowed a variety of conditions to be reserved in favor of
the grantor, under the theory that the contract is only partly written. 59 These cases have been examined. Their importance here is
that they make the above principle largely impotent.
Fraud,60 illegality, 61 and mistake may be shown because they impair the validity of the writing. The mistake, however, must be
mutual,6 2 or a unilateral mistake known to or induced by the opposite
party. 68 A purely unilateral mistake has no effect on the validity of
the writing. 4 In such a case the mistaken party is bound by the
reasonable impression made by his words and conduct.
136 N. C.350, 48 S. E. 768 (1905).
Gibson v. Partee, 19 N. C.530 (1837) (deed) ; and see Chastien v. Phillips,
33 N. C. 255, 8 (1850) (deed); Blume v. Blume, 24 N. C. 338 (1842) (bond);
Cross v. Long, 51 N. C. 154 (1858).

Ante notes 24 and 43.
"Powell v. Heptinstall, 79 N. C. 207 (1878) (defendant drew up deed and
concealed fact from plaintiff that -it contained more land than had been agreed
under a compromise settlement) ; Knight v. Houghtalling, 85 N. C. 17 (1881)
(contract to buy land; defendant purchaser allowed to show fraudulent representation as to purchase) ; Hunter v. Sherron, 176 N. C. 226, 97 S. E. 5 (1918)
(misrepresentation as to effect of signing note held equivalent to fraudulent
promise not to hold defendant to full extent of liability indicated by note);
Hardware Co. v. Kinion, 191 N. C. 218, 131 S. E. 579 (1926) (agreement by
plaintiff to cancel judgment in considertaion of note in suit allowed to be shown
to prove fraud, in that plaintiff did not intend to carry out agreement).
Strother v. Cathey, 5 N. C. 162 (1807) (grant of land by state officers
forbidden by law); Hinton v. Insurance Co., 135 N. C. 314, 47 S. E. 474
(1905) (illegal agreement between insured and administrator).
'Brady v. Parker, 39 N. C. 430 (1847) ; and see Jones v. Warren, 134 N. C.
390, 4, 46 S. E. 740, 2 (1904).
"Gray v. James, 151 N. C. 80, 65 S. E. 644 (1909) (deed misrepresentect
to grantor who signed without reading); McCall v. Toxaway Co., 152 N. C.
648, 68 S. E. 136 (1910) (release of personal injury claim).
"Coleman v. Crumpler, 13 N. C. 508 (1830) (wrong name in bond conditioned to perform decree of court) ; Newbern v. Newbern, 178 N. C. 3, 100
S. E. 77 (1919) (signing absolute deed under belief that it was a mortgage).
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As in the case of conditions precedent, the showing of fraud is
not prevented by a written stipulation that the writing contains the
whole of the agreement. This provision, like all others, is vitiated
by the fraud. 65
The burden of persuasion in the fraud and mistake cases is not
the familiar "preponderance," but "clear, cogent, and convincing
proof." It is doubtful whether the latter ephithet produces any effect
on the ordinary jury's minds different from the former, but failure
to propound to them the magical formula is cause for a new trial.0 0
Written Recital of Facts
A written recital of facts does not come within the scope of the
parol evidence rule. Accordingly, the date in a deed, 67 or the return
on a warrant 8 may be contradicted. Likewise a written record of
facts may be supplemented. Proof of the hour of registering a deed
is allowed in aid of a written indorsement of the day;09 and proof
that a certain writing shown to a deponent was the one presently in
70
issue is allowed in aid of a written deposition.
The more troublesome cases concern a written recital of the
receipt of a consideration. It has always been held that a mere recital
of the receipt of money is disputable. 7 ' The same is true of a notation of payment on a negotiable instrument.72 But when such a
recital was accompanied by an exoneration or other promise, the older
cases held it to be indisputable.73 These cases are clearly erroneous.
The recital is still one of past facts, even though it is accompanied by
a promise. Williston puts the matter succinctly :4
" . . . the only case where the parol evidence rule is applicable to
a recital of consideration is where the consideration recited is itself
'Wolf. Co. v. Mercantile Co., 189 N. C. 322, 127 S. E. 208 (1925); cf.
Colt v. Springle, 190 N. C. 229, 129 S. E. 449 (1925) (under similar facts evidence of fraud insufficient semble).
'Harding v. Long, 103 N. C. 1, 9 S. E. 445 (1889).
"Cutler v. Cutler, 3 N. C. 154 (1801).
"See Forbes v. Wiggins, 112 N. C. 122, 6, 16 S. E. 905, 7 (1893).
Metts v. Bright, 20 N. C. 311 (1838).
"In re Clodfelter's Will, 171 N. C. 528, 88 S. E. 625 (1916).
'Pritchett v. Dawson, 32 N. C. 436 (1849) ; Warlick v. Barnett, 46 N. C.
539 (1854); Harper v. Dail, 92 N. C. 394 (1885) ; Norwood v. Grand Lodge,
179 N. C.441, 102 S. E. 749 (1920).
"Lancaster v. Stanfield, 191 N. C. 340, 132 S. E. 21 (1926).
"Brocket v. Foscue, 8 N. C. 65 (1820) ( exoneration); Smith v. Brown,
10 N. C. 580 (1825) (exoneration and condition); Wilkinson v. Wilkinson,
17 N. C. 376 (1833) (recital in deed) ; Brown v. Brooks, 52 N. C. 94 (1859)
(promise to deliver slave); Mendenhall v. Parish, 53 N. C. 105 (1860) (recital in deed).
"2 WnzasToN, op. cit. supra note 3, §115b.
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a promise. That is, where the contract purports to be bilateral the
parol evidence rule clearly forbids either party to. a writing, though
unsealed, to show that his own promise or that of his co-contractor
was not accurately stated or was not given, as the writing states, in
consideration of the other promise. This is the only estoppel by
writing. It should, however, be observed that frequently when consideration is recited in a written contract as having been given, it will
be true that though the consideration was not given the parties in fact
agreed that the consideration recited should be given as such. This
intention on any theory may be shown, since the evidence supports the
instrument though varying a recital."
These early cases are overruled by Shaw v. William,. 75
Similarly the recitation of payment of consideration in a deed may
be disputed.76 It is said that this may be done for any purpose other
than invalidating the deed. Put more simply, this merely means that
a deed requires no consideration, but a mere recitation thereof is
sufficient as a conveyancing phrase and prevents a resulting use.
Acknowledgment of payment of premiums in insurance policies may
77
likewise be contradicted.
Interpretation
Much confusion has resulted from treating the simple processes
of interpreting a writing as exceptions to the rule against adding to,
varying, or contradicting its terms. The forbidding jargon about
parol evidence to explain-the situation and relation of the parties,
the real transaction, to fit the description to the thing, to put the court
in possession of all the facts, ad infinitum-and the so-called doctrine
of patent and latent ambiguities are reducible to a simple residuum
of elementary principles.
The necessity for interpreting every writing is perennial. No
matter how clear its terms, in and of itself it means nothing until
applied to external things. "The words used must be translated into
things and facts."7 8 The admission of extrinsic evidence is an inevitable part of the process. The existence of the purported obligor
or grantQr, identification of the present parties with the writing, the.
existence of the subject-matter and its identity as that referred to in.

"100 N. C. 272, 6 S. E. 196 (1899). See also Barbee v. Barbee, 108 N. C.
591 19 S.E. 168 (1891) (leading case).
6 Barbee v. Barbee, supra note 75; Smith v. Arthur, 110 N. C. 400, 15 S. E.
197 (1892).
"Kendrick v. Insurance Co., 124 N. C. 315, 32 S. E. 728 (1899) ; Britton v.
Insurance Co., 165 N. C. 149, 80 S. E. 1072 (1914).
"Holmes, J., in Doherty v. Hill, 144 Mass. 468, 11 N. E. 581 (1887), quoted
in 2 Wn-LIsTON, op. cit. supranote 3, §601, note 2.
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the writing-these at least are necessary to give any writing significance. Pearson, J., in Institute v. Norwood79 gives the crux of the
matter:
" . . . there being no defect of either the person or thing on the face
of the instrument, it becomes necessary to fit the description to the
person or thing; in other words to identify it. Here as a matter of
course evidence dehors is admissible, because in fact it is necessary,
and there is no getting on without it, in any case; for although the
instrument may give the most minute description, it cannot identify."
The significance of the parol evidence rule is that it defines and
delimits what matters shall be subjected to interpretation. The inquiry in interpretation is always: what does the writing mean? In
order to answer this question parol evidence of various sorts is provisionally admitted.8 0 But this evidence affects the merits only
through the medium of the writing by convincing the interpretor that
the extrinsic evidence sheds light on the meaning of the writing. The
fallacy of calling each type of evidence that is admitted for interpretative purposes an exception to the parol evidence rule is manifest.
Theoretically every circumstance helpful in arriving at the meaning of the writing should be considered. Practical safeguards have
grown up against manufactured testimony tending to overthrow the
clear meaning of the writing judged by popular standards in the use
of words. The most important of these is the local rule that only an
ambiguity can be explained, beyond the aforementioned explanation
indispensable for any writing.8 1 Another is the rule that forbids any
- 45 N. C. 65 (1852).

'The following illustrate some of the different types of evidence that have
been considered: Pitts v. Curtis, 152 N. C. 615, 68 S. E. 189 (1910) (conveyance of "all my timber X may -want for lumber" held too uncertain in absence
of showing that parties had marked trees to be cut) ; Taylor v. Meadows, 175
N. C. 373, 95 S. E. 662 (1918) (previous occupancy with consent of land now
in dispute) ; Council v. Sanderlin, 183 N. C. 253, 111 S. E. 365 (1922) (letter
of mesne grantee recognizing reservation now disputed) ; Blankenship v. Dowtin, 191 N. C. 790, 133 S. E. 199 (1926) (previous interpretation given to
ambiguous grant by parties thereto).
(punctuation);
"Allowed:
Graham v. Hamilton, 27 N. C. 428 (1845)
Richards v. Schlegelmich, 65 N. C. 150 (1871) (word "continues" in written
condition that mine "continues . . . a good gold mine") ; Osborne v. Calvert,
83 N. C. 365 (1880) (explaining arbitrator's award) ; Dunkhart v. Rineheart,
89 N. C. 354 (1883) ("any of my black walnut trees not exceeding 15 in number") ; Perry v. Scott, 109 N. C. 374, 14 S. E. 294 (1891) ("lying and being
in County of Jones, and bounded as follows: on the South side of Trent River,
adjoining the lands of X, Y, and others and containing 360 acres"-leading
deed case; review of authorities by Shepherd, J.); Lupton v. Lupton, 117 N.
C. 30, 23 S. E. 184 (1895) ("one-half of a boat"); Layton v. Manufacturing
Co., 161 N. C. 482, 77 S. E. 677 (1913) ("car load") ; Neal v. Ferry Co., 166
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use of parol declarations of intention where the writing purports to
embody the expression of that intention.8 2 The reason for this rule
is found in the practical difficulty of treating such evidence provisionally and the consequent danger of setting it up substantively in
competition with the writing.
The standards of interpretation are inherently flexible and the
precedents involve such inconsistencies as disallowing a showing that
recitation of a $500 note in a deed of trust to secure creditors meant
a $430 note between the same parties, 8 3 yet allowing a showing that
a black horse in a chattel mortgage meant a bay horse !84 The diverse
rulings cited in the note demonstrate the futility of further generalization. It should be noted in passing that when an instrument is
void for uncertainty the euphemism "patent ambiguity" is employed.
Naturally a void instrument cannot be interpreted.8 5 This simple
principle is veiled in obscurity by the familiar assertion that "parol
evidence is not admissible to explain a patent ambiguity." This
N. C. 563, 82 S. E. 878 (1914)

("approximation" in engineering contract);

Huffman v. Lumber Co., 169 N. C. 259, 85 S. E. 148 (1915)

(that indorsement

on note "payment on above" meant payment on open account attached thereto) ;
Richardson v. Woodruff, 178 N. C. 46, 100 S. E. 173 (1919) ("that shrinkage
be stood by purchaser").
Disallowed: Miller v. Lucas, 5 N. C. 227 (1809) (subject matter of mortgage); Howell v. Hooks, 17 N. C. 259 (1832) (bond); Knight v. Bunn, 42
N. C. 77 (1850) (that note to J. Ricks in deed of trust to secure creditors
meant note to D. A. T. Ricks) ; Dail v. Jones, 85 N. C. 222 (1881) (that conveyance to take effect after death meant conveyance of present interest);
Davis v. King, 89 N. C. 441 (1883) (that proceedings to legitimatize meant a
revocation of will) ; Elliott v. Whedbee, 94 N. C. 115 (1886) (that payment
to personal representative meant payment to children) ; White v. Carrol, 147
N. C. 330, 61 S. E. 196 (1908) (subject matter of mortgage); Rivenbark v.
Teachey, 150 N. . 289, 63 S. E. 1036 (1909) (that specified acreage meant
less) ; Pate v. Lumber Co., 165 N. C. 184, 81 S. E. 132 (1913) (that "all my
right, title, and interest" in deed meant less than all grantor's land) ; Brick Co.
v. Hodgin, 190 N. C. 582, 130 S. E. 330 (1925) (that easement was different
from that expressed in deed).
"Robertson v. Dunn, 6 N. C. 133 (1812) (question whether instrument
was deed or will; proof excluded that draftsman was requested to draw deed
of gift-assertion by conduct) ; Scott v. Green, 89 N. C. 278 (1883) (intention
of arbitrators) ; Mudge v. Varner, 146 N. C. 147, 59 S. E. 540 (1907) (intent
of guarantor of notes) ; Sherrod v. Battle, 154 N. C. 345, 70 S. E. 834 (1911).
"Dismukes v. Wright, 20 N. C. 347 (1839).
"Harris v. Woodward, 96 N. C. 232, 1 S. E. 544 (1887).
" In the following cases the instruments were held void for uncertainty
("contained a patent ambiguity"): Roundtree v. Britt, 94 N. C. 104 (1886)
(mortgage--"my entire crop of every description") ; Kiff v. Kiff, 95 N. C. 71
(1886) (debt of defendant for "labor for 3 1/2 years" in allotment of widow's
year's allowance) ; Holman v. Whitaker, 119 N. C. 113, 25 S. E. 793 (1896)
(chattel mortgage-"one horse wagon"-mortgagor had four such wagons);
Farthing v. Rochelle, 131 N. C. 563, 43 S. E. 1 (1902) ("your lot" in contract
to buy-contra: Sessoms v. Bazemon, 180 N. C. 103, 104 S. E. 38 (1920)) ;
Cathey v. Lumber Co., 151 N. C. 592, 66 S. E. 580 (1909) (deed description).
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verbal juggling produced the redundant "latent ambiguity" to characterize the contents of an instrument permitting interpretation by
parol evidence. The unnatural and technical connotations that these
Elizabethanisms (they were derived from Lord Bacon) have acquired is illustrated by the shrewd statement of Pearson, C. J., that
every conceivable grant involves a latent ambiguity.8 6 The usual case
of ambiguity is one of omitting too much from the writing. If, however, the elements of a clear description are present, but are obscured
by superfluous and erroneous details the writing is treated as containing an ambiguity within the rule that permits full interpretation
with the aid of parol testimony 8 7
In the ordinary case of a written instrument, there being no ambiguity and of course the parol evidence rule preventing any competitive written or oral substantive evidence, the instrument speaks
for itself aided by that minimum of collateral parol evidence necessary in every case to give significance to the writing. There is an
exception in the case of deeds. No matter how clear the description,
if the parties run the actual boundaries contemporaneously with the
execution of the deed, this "practical location" prevails. This is not
put on the basis that the written boundaries are not intended to supersede oral agreements, nor that the "practical location" is collateral
evidence provisionally admitted to aid in interpreting the written
description. Indeed in the normal case neither the reasonable man
test of intent nor the interpretative process could bring about the results actually obtained. The doctrine seems to be a genuine exception
to the parol evidence rule.8 8 Mention should also be made of the
familar canons determining the relative importance of monuments,
courses, distances, and contents in interpreting ambiguous deed
descriptions.8 9
Executed Parol Agreements
A plea of accord and satisfaction of an obligation created by a
writing raises a fascinating problem, and the use of agreements extrinsic to the writing bears an analogy to their use for interpretation.
Institute v. Norwood, supra note 79.
Goff v. Pope, 83 N. C. 123 (1880) (misdescription as to location of engine
conveyed by mortgage).
'Person v. Roundtree, 2 N. C. 378 (1796) ; Reed v. Shenck, 13 N. C. 415
(1829) (dictum); Clarke v. Aldridge, 162 N. C. 326, 78 S. E. 216 (1913);
Woodard v. Harrell, 191 N. C. 194, 132 S. E. 12 (1926).
'Lumber Co. v. Hutton, 152 N. C. 537, 68 S. E. 2 (1910) ; Gray v. Coleman,
171 N. C. 344, 88 S. E. 489'(1916).
'
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Of course, when a check or other instrument for less than the
amount claimed is marked "in full payment" and accepted by the
obligee, a parol agreement that it should cover only part of the indebtedness may not be shown. Reasonable men would intend the
90
written notation of full payment to supersede their oral agreements.
91
Plaintiff and
A nicer problem is presented by Richards v. Hodges.
defendant were majority stockholders in the Bell-Richards Shoe Co.
Defendant bought plaintiff's stock giving personal notes in payment.
The suit was on these notes. Defendant pleaded an accord, in that
plaintiff accepted notes of the Shoe Co. in discharge of defendant's
personal notes. The evidence showed that plaintiff had taken notes
of the Shoe Co., and defendant offered to prove an oral agreement
between them at the time the personal notes were given, to the effect
that they were to be discharged in this way. The court held that,
although the oral agreement contradicted the written notes, it could
be shown under the plea of accord. The holding is clearly right.
The vital question is the obligee's intent in accepting a different
performance from that vouchsafed him by the writing. A parol
stipulation contemporaneous with the writing that the performance
should be that now pleaded as an accord is cogent evidence that the
obligee so accepted it. It will be noticed, however, that the very plea
of accord recognizes that the original obligation is determined by the
writing. The factors involved in this problem are usually treated as
an exception to the parol evidence rule and summed up in the loose
statement that "an executed parol agreement may be shown."
IV.

CONCLUSION

There are at least three possible hypotheses where an alleged oral
transaction is sought to be used to alter what would be the effect of
a writing standing alone: 1. The oral transaction may be fabricated.
2. It may have taken place but the final written embodiment may have
been intended to supersede it. 3. It may have been intended by the
parties to stand with equal effect with the writing. Which of these
three possibilities is true is a question of fact, which under the normal
division of judicial functions would fall to the jury. The parol
evidence rule is a device to give the judge a special control of this
three-faced fact problem, excluding the matter from the jury unless
he concludes that under all the circumstances the third situation is a
Loach, 181 N. C.394, 127 S. E. 419 (1925).
183,De80 S. E. 439 (1913).
164 Loach
N. C. v.
"0De
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reasonable probability. This special control is thought necessary
because of a supposed danger that juries for economic and emotional
reasons may be too ready to allow parties to escape from burdensome
written engagements. The North Carolina practice seems to be to
ask only two questions-one preliminary; the other, final. They are
addressed respectively to the judge and jury: 1. Does the oral agreement contradict the writing? 2. If not, was the said oral agreement
made? Attention of either branch is nowhere focused upon the
question-a very practical one in view of the frequency with which
oral tentative agreements are abandoned when the final writing is
executed-was the writing intended to supersede the oral agreement
now set up in competition with it? A review of the cases suggests
a serious doubt whether this method of administration is a sufficient
safeguard for the stability of written transactions to meet the needs
of the business elements of the community.

